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A Law Antecedent and Paramount
Fred H. Cate*

"Congress shall make no law... abridging freedom of speech or of
the press." Whatever else the First Amendment may mean, the Supreme
Court has interpreted it to forbid the government from restricting expression
because it disagrees with the sentiment expressed;' restricting expression
prior to its utterance or publication;2 and making impermissible distinctions
by content,3 compelling speech4 or access to the expressive capacity of
another,5 without demonstrating that the abridgement is narrowly tailored
to serve a compelling governmental interest. These First Amendment
principles restrict not merely Congress, but all federal and state governmental agencies, and apply to expression that the Court has determined
does not independently warrant protection,6 conduct that involves no
speech,7 and activities ancillary to expression
Despite the force and breadth of the Supreme Court's interpretation
of the First Amendment, its application has not been uniformly consistent.
When confronted with restrictions on telegraph and telephone communications and on over-the-air radio and television broadcasting, the Court has
assumed-often with little explanation-that "differences in the character-

* Associate Professor of Law and Faculty Advisor to the Federal Communications
Law Journal, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; Senior Fellow, The
Annenberg Washington Program in Communications Policy Studies; Of Counsel, Fields &
Director, P.C.
1. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
2. See, e.g., Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
3. See, e.g., Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641 (1984) (plurality opinion).
4. See, e.g., West Virginia State Board of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
5. See, e.g., Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
6. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
7. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
8. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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istics of new media justify differences in the First Amendment standards
applied to them."9
Telegraph companies, for example, were routinely treated by courts
as common carriers, analogous to the railroads that their lines so often ran
along, rather than to the press or other speakers whose messages their lines
carried. As common carriers, telegraph companies were subject to significant legislative and judicial regulation. They were required to serve all who
requested carriage at a reasonable price and subject to reasonable regulations, without discriminating among customers or other carriers. The First
Amendment played no role in the evaluation of these restrictions on
telegraph companies.
Laws governing the telegraph were the obvious model for the
telephone. In 1910, Congress passed the Mann-Elkins Act, ° classifying
telephone companies as common carriers and subjecting them to the
regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission. In 1934, Congress
passed the Communications Act," the legislation that this Journal issue
commemorates. Title II of the Act, regulating common carriers, was taken
almost intact from the Mann-Elkins Act. As with regulation of the
telegraph, there was no mention of the First Amendment; a law designed
for regulating the nation's railroads had been given a new name and
applied to the nation's largest communications industry.
The First Amendment rights of broadcasters have fared only
marginally better. In the Radio Act of 1927,2 Congress restricted
broadcasting to persons licensed by the federal government, and then only
on the frequencies and during the times assigned to them. Broadcast licensees which carried the advertisements of one political candidate were required to give or sell equal time to opposing candidates. In a single provision, the Act forbad censorship of broadcast programming while it banned
obscene, indecent, or profane language. Finally, the 1927 Act created a new
administrative body-the Federal Radio Commission-to oversee the
licensing process.
Under the guise of remedying interference with military, particularly
naval, transmissions, and among commercial and amateur stations, the
Radio Act of 1927 permitted the newly created Commission to deny use of
the broadcast spectrum to anyone whose future expression the Commission

9. Red Lion Brdcst. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
10. Pub. L. No. 61-218, § 7, 36 Stat. 539, 544-45 (1910) (superseded by the
Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 602(a), 48 Stat. 1064).
11. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 602(a), 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended
in scattered section of 47 U.S.C.).
12. Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162.
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believed might not serve the "public interest, convenience, or necessity."
As with common carriers, all would-be broadcasters became subject to a
prior restraint, unless and until the Commission chose to remove the bar
created by the Act. The Act compelled licensed broadcasters to grant access
to their transmission capacity to candidates for public office. The
significance of this incursion is only enhanced by the fact that the people
who passed and signed the law were and would be again candidates for
public office. The 1927 Act also required censorship of broadcast programming, at least to the extent necessary to enforce the Act's ban on "obscene,
indecent, or profane language," while purporting to forbid government
control over the content of broadcast expression. The First Amendment was
nowhere to be found.
The 1927 Act was soon replaced by the Communications Act of 1934,
Title III of which, covering broadcasters, was taken virtually intact from the
1927 Act. When broadcasters challenged the 1934 Act's restrictions on
their First Amendment rights, they were told by the Supreme Court that
"[u]nlike other modes of expression, radio inherently is not available to all.
That is its unique characteristic, and that is why, unlike other modes of
expression, it is subject to governmental regulation."'13 The Court's
reasoning, which was to become the basis for half a century of future cases,
began with the concept of electromagnetic spectrum scarcity, where there
are more potential broadcasters than there was broadcast spectrum to
accommodate their transmissions.
The Supreme Court expanded on the reasons why the First Amendment applies with less force to broadcasting than to print media in Red
Lion BroadcastingCo. v. Federal Communications Commission (FCC or
Commission). 4 Justice White, writing for the unanimous Court, stressed
that "[b]ecause of the scarcity of radio frequencies, the Government is
permitted to put restraints on licensees."' As a result, broadcasters owe
a duty to the public to provide them with "suitable access to social,
political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences."' 6 Rather than
occupy the spectrum for their own expressive purposes, broadcasters are to
serve the interests of the public as identified by the FCC and enforced by
the courts. Like other trustees, broadcasters can be restrained from, or
compelled to, action to serve the interest of their trust beneficiaries. "It
does not violate the First Amendment to treat licensees given the privilege
of using scarce radio frequencies as proxies for the entire community,
13.
14.
15.
16.

NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226 (1943).
Red Lion, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
Id. at 390.
Id. (citations omitted).
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obligated
to give suitable time and attention to matters of great public con7
cern."'

Red Lion demonstrates the power of the scarcity doctrine. It has been
found to justify not only licensing broadcasters and setting standards for
picking and choosing among applicants, but also compelling broadcasters
to cover subjects they might not otherwise have selected and permitting the
expression of others in response to that coverage. Only five years after Red
Lion was decided, the Court would unanimously strike down a far more
limited intrusion into the First Amendment rights of newspaper publishers.
The interests of the public in a competitive and responsible press in Miami
Heraldcould not justify "[c]ompelling editors or publishers to publish that
which "'reason" tells them should not be published.""' In Red Lion,
similar interests were used by the unanimous Court to justify obliterating
the independent First Amendment interests of broadcasters. The only
difference between the two cases was the medium involved.
II
Today, spectrum scarcity is widely recognized as having little
relevance to broadcast regulation. Moreover, the Supreme Court recognized
in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC,9 that "the rationale for
applying a less rigorous standard of First Amendment scrutiny to broadcast
regulation ... does not apply in the context of cable regulation,"2 the
technology through which most Americans today view video programming.
Telephone companies, too, are beginning to be recognized by courts
as First Amendment speakers. Four federal courts in the past year have
enjoined enforcement of the telephone-cable cross-ownership ban2 ' on the
basis that it is "facially unconstitutional as a violation of plaintiffs' First
Amendment right to free expression." 2 Almost a century of regulations

17. Id. at 394.
18. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256 (1974).
19. Turner Brdcst., 114 S. Ct. 2445, reh'g denied, 115 S. Ct. 30 (1994).
20. Id. at 2458.
21. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 613(b), 98 Stat.
2779, 2785 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 533(b) (1988)) ("It shall be unlawful for any common
carrier, subject in whole or in part to subchapter II of this chapter, to provide video
programming directly to subscribers in its telephone service area, either directly or indirectly
through an affiliate owned by, operated by, controlled by, or under common control with
the common carrier.').
22. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 830 F. Supp. 909, 932 (E.D. Va.
1993), aff'd, No. 93-2340 (4th Cir. Nov. 21, 1994); see also US West, Inc. v. United States,
855 F. Supp. 1184 (W.D. Wash. 1994); BellSouth Corp. v. United States, No. CV 93-32661-S (N.D. Ala. Sept. 23, 1994); Ameritech Corp. v. United States, Nos. 93C6642,
94C4089, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15512 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 27, 1994).
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that ignored the First Amendment rights of communications common
carriers and undervalued the First Amendment rights of broadcasters is
under attack and the pace of change, while slow, is escalating. The 1934
Communication Act's disregard for the First Amendment applied in the
context of electronic media is finally being reversed.
A new medium of communication, however, is attracting the attention
of regulators and once again calling into question the role of the First
Amendment. This new battleground for fundamental First Amendment
freedoms is the network of computer networks, the so-called information
superhighway, and its dramatically expanding precursor, the Internet.
Growing at a rate of 750,000 new users per month, the Internet today
connects more than 45,000 separate networks and 25 to 30 million users in
more than 100 countries.' The fastest growing sector of the Internet is
commercial information providers, which is not surprising given that
corporate spending on information technology in the United States in 1993
reached $200 billion, up from just over $150 billion in 1992.24
The Clinton administration has responded to charges that the power,
scope, and enormous potential of information technologies warrant
government regulation by launching an ambitious information policymaking
initiative focused on the National Information Infrastructure (NII). Set forth
on September 15, 1993, in the Agenda for Action, the administration's
initiative addresses the "essential role" of the government in promoting and
controlling the nation's information infrastructure.2 1 The central component of this initiative is the Information Infrastructure Task Force, chaired
by Ron Brown, Secretary of Commerce.
Absent from the current policymaking debate about electronic
information is any mention of the First Amendment. Neither the legal
constraints imposed by the First Amendment on government regulation of
expression, nor the importance of free expression, appear in the Agenda for
Action, are the subject of any NII Task Force committee or working group,
or even warrant mention in a single speech on the NII by any senior administration official. The silence is reminiscent of the 1934 Act's regulation
of telegraph and telephone companies, and radio and television broadcasters.
The absence of the First Amendment is of substantially greater
consequence in the case of electronic information than it was with

23. Latest Estimates of Internet Growth, ONLINE NEwsLETTER, Nov. 1994, available
in LEXIS, News Library, Nwsltr File.
24. Massive Outlays, WALL ST. J., Nov. 14, 1994, at R18.

25. INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK
INFRAsTRUCTURE AGENDA FOR ACTION 6 (1993).

FORCE,

NATIONAL

INFORMATION
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telegraphy, telephony, and broadcasting, because the vast majority of
communication in the United States today is electronic. This is not a
peripheral issue. Text is composed on word processors, stored in computer
memories, transmitted via local networks, telephone lines, and satellites,
and captured on printers, facsimiles, and computer monitors. Images and
sounds are captured by cameras, scanners, microphones, and other sensors,
stored on tape or disc, broadcast over the air or through coaxial cables or
optical fibers, and displayed on television or computer screens or heard on
radio. Data and voice signals are collected by telephones, computers, and
remote sensors, and transmitted via pairs of copper wires, optical fibers,
and satellites, or beamed through the air. Documents are printed, photocopied, facsimiled, scanned, and increasingly stored electronically.
No form of communication other than face-to-face conversation and
hand-written, hand-delivered messages, escapes the reach of electronic
information technologies. As those exceptions indicate, no communication
that bridges geographic space or is accessible to more than a few people
exists today without some electronic component. And the dominance of
electronic communication is growing. E-mail, computer bulletin boards,
national and even global networks, truly portable telephones, digital
facsimile machines, voice mail, nationwide paging services, interactive
television, video telephones, and countless other technologies are decreasing
our reliance on those few remaining non-electronic communication systems,
such as the post office, and forever changing the way we communicate. If
the First Amendment does not apply to these media, it has little relevance
today, and even less in the twenty-first century.
The omission of the First Amendment is all the more significant in
light of the substantial regulatory role that the administration anticipates the
government should play. In his first address on the NII after publication of
the Agenda for Action, Vice President Al Gore-the intellectual and
political force in the administration pushing the NII-analogized the current
information marketplace to the environment that, in his view, permitted the
sinking of the Titanic. The Vice President asked why the Titanic's radio
operators did not receive the warnings about icebergs in the vicinity and
why so few ships responded to the Titanic's distress signals.
The answer is that-as the investigations proved-the wireless
business then was just that, a business. Operators had no obligation to
remain on duty. They were to do what was profitable. When the day's
work was done-often the lucrative transmissions from wealthy
passengers-operators shut off their sets and went to sleep....
Ironically, that tragedy resulted in the first efforts to regulate the
airwaves.
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Why did government get involved? Because there are certain
public needs that outweigh private interests.26
The Vice President's focus on regulating "private interests" to serve
"public needs," however worthy, raises special concerns when those private
interests are involved in providing information services and products. The
complete absence of the First Amendment from the policymaking debate
exacerbates those concerns because it suggests that they have not been
identified and resolved, but rather ignored by the government.
The First Amendment and the judicial opinions and commentary
interpreting it are more than just limits on government action; they reflect
principles and aspirations which, while inconsistent and even flawed, offer
important guidance for regulation or regulatory forbearance. In short, the
First Amendment is central to the information policymaking process not
only because compliance with its terms is constitutionally required of every
law or regulation emanating from that process, but also because the First
Amendment, and the discussion surrounding it, contribute something
positive and valuable to the process-a constitutional commitment to free
expression and to reaping the benefits of free expression without government interference.
If sixty years experience with the Communications Act of 1934 has
taught us nothing else, it must caution against excluding powerful
communications media from the full protection of the First Amendment. To
do so with today's electronic information technologies would create an
exception that would make the rule of freedom of expression meaningless.

26. Vice President Al Gore, Remarks at the National Press Club (Dec. 21, 1993) (copy
on file with the Federal Communications Law Journal).
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